Cardlytics ($CDLX): Similarities to a 100 Bagger
Why Cardlytics is currently in a similar situation to when Buffett and Munger invested into the Washington Post, which became a 100x investment.
For those interested, this post is also available on YouTube, Apple Podcasts, and Spotify.
Market Cap as of 9.15.2022: ~$12.3/Share x 32.9M Shares ~ $405M Market Cap.
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The Growing Opportunity
I thought it may be helpful to look at the current CDLX situation (fear of losing Chase + macro fears + low sector sentiment and the corresponding low stock price) from a different perspective, and even from a different voice (Charlie Munger), to better understand the growing investment opportunity present with Cardlytics.
This post is significantly less detailed and less “in the weeds” than most of my Cardlytics posts. If anything, this post gives a good high-level overview of Cardlytics, its current situation with Chase, and why the company’s investment prospects today are possibly the best they have ever been.
Similarities to Munger’s 100 Bagger
On November 25, 2021, Steven Pinker released a podcast episode of “Think with Pinker” with Charlie Munger.
The quotes below are all of Charlie Munger in the 2021 interview, as well as in the order he spoke.
When first listening in late 2021 to Charlie’s comments regarding his and Buffett’s investment in the Washington Post, I could not help but draw some similarities to the Cardlytics situation, first with BofA, and now once again with Chase. Recognizing patterns or similar setups to past situations can help give us an idea of what could happen in a current situation.
The following post is something I first discussed nearly a year ago in my Research Notes when drawing similarities between the CDLX/BofA renewal situation, which turned out as I expected, with the fears being irrational and BofA renewing.
I think the current Chase situation will play out in a similar fashion to both BofA (with the fears being irrational) and the following historical example of when Buffett and Munger invested into the Washington Post (that ended being a 100 bagger).
General Similarities / Summary
Before getting into the all the Munger quotes, the following are some general similarities of the businesses and the situations, comparing WaPo in 1973/74 to CDLX today:
Both make the vast majority of their revenue from advertising
WaPo’s Ad Distribution: Newspapers, magazines, television stations
CDLX’s Ad Distribution: Banks, by placing cash-back offers funded by advertisers within the banks for users to redeem
Both have agreements to advertise to large audiences / user bases
WaPo: Licenses for television stations
CDLX: Partnerships with banks
Both have fears of losing those advertising channels
WaPo: Fear of Nixon taking away licenses to television stations
CDLX: Fear of Chase taking away access to Chase Offers
Both have a period of a market-wide selloff during the same time as the internal fears
Both selling cheap in relation to intrinsic value due to those fears (will be discussed more)
Both have strong competitive advantages (will be discussed more)
Both have the possible makings of a monopoly from being the only option (will be discussed more)
Both had a CEO change
WaPo: Katherine Graham become president in 1963 due to her husband’s death, but was elected CEO in 1973 (around the time of Buffett’s and Munger’s investment)
CDLX: Karim Temsamani took over as CEO September 1, 2022
While there are these general similarities between the two businesses, there are obvious differences (management, environment, profitability and financials, liquidation value of assets, partner dependencies, years in business, and much more). These differences will lead to Cardlytics’s future developments to not exactly replicate that of the Washington Post.
However, given the similarities in the behavior and fear of the markets/investors, it could help us explain the irrationality that may be present again today with Cardlytics and the opportunity presented to us.
Patterns of Noise (and Others Being Too Fearful)
Charlie Munger on Washington Post:
Steven Pinker: “Charlie, you investing in the Washington Post, at a time when everyone else thought it was on the way down. Would you say this is an example of not getting distracted by random fluctuations, and keeping your eye on the long-term odds?"
Charlie Munger: "What happens in the investment world is quite interesting. If you look at the noise of the constant movement of stock prices, the value investors like Warren and me, in picking these stocks we ignore the noise, we just ignore the random movements and we look for intrinsic value. But we look at the patterns of the noise to pick our hunting places for value investments."
Cardlytics:
Cardlytics also has the same noise of general macroeconomic fears (+ higher pessimism with a given sector such as tech today), + internal fears / pessimism with their individual business. These short-term fears can lead to selling beyond a rational point, such as significantly below long-term intrinsic value. This can be from others not investing for the long term, not familiar with the individual business, not willing to risk the lack of absolutely certainty, coming to quick and incorrect conclusions, and more.
Therefore, not only does Munger mention the idea of looking for patterns, but we have the pattern here of finding a business in a similar situation which gives rise to the opportunity. These short-term fluctuations in price from the noise related to fears of losing advertising distribution + macro fears, lead to a low price in relation to intrinsic value. (If only there was a common investment saying that could tell us how we should act when others are this fearful.)
But this is only where the similarities begin.
Makings of a Monopoly
Charlie Munger on Washington Post:
“They had a newspaper which was not yet a monopoly”
Cardlytics:
Cardlytics could have the makings of a monopoly, where banks looking to aggregate their reach for advertising could all eventually only using Cardlytics (including the banks not using an internal solution).
The odds of this have increased with Figg possibly no longer being an option for other banks, given Chase’s acquisition of Figg (which is one of the reasons that the acquisition by Chase was great for Cardlytics).
We also have the possibility of banks like AmEx eventually using CDLX, with the potential of others, given the superior (and growing) value proposition (larger reach for more and better offers, product-level offers, local offers, new user interface, more advanced technology, and more).
Similar to how most cards have to offer at least the 1-3% cash back to remain competitive, I believe Cardlytics will eventually become the new minimum / table stakes.
Cardlytics is not there today, but in the near future, with enough offers that a user could save an average of 5-10% on similar purchases, I’m not sure how other banks will remain competitive without using Cardlytics to have this available to their users.
Given this higher cash back comes from advertisers funding the cash back (rather than the interchange fee or other internal sources by the banks), and from the advertisers willing to advertise given the larger ad reach from Cardlytics aggregating the banks and their users (as opposed to the banks on their own), I believe other banks (and neobanks) will continue to partner with Cardlytics to receive these benefits and not be left behind (and therefore it is less of a discussion of differentiation among the banks using CDLX, even though this is possible from customizing the UI + banks selecting which modules on the new ad server to integrate + the self-service from banks tool on the new ad server called “Engage”). These additional bank partners will lead to more reach and data, attracting more advertisers to place offers, improving engagement and redemptions for users, attracting more bank and neobank partners, and so on.
Valuable Distribution for Advertisers
Charlie Munger on Washington Post:
“and they had great, big television stations, which were network stations in very populous communities, which were total gold mines and sure to be silver a long time ahead. So the Washington Post was just a trove of intrinsic value.”
Cardlytics:
Cardlytics has similar reach / end users via their partnerships with many of the largest banks, opening up the possibility for large advertising spend over a long period of time.
Cardlytics has near exclusive distribution or rights to advertise in the banks, which is brand safe and bot free, and has trusted association with the offers by the users given they are within the banks.
Additionally, the viewing of ads is solicited by the users unlike nearly all other forms of advertisements, and users are looking at the offers when users are most thinking about their money.
Cardlytics also has access and the ability to advertise + target + measure based upon actual transactional data, which has great value to advertisers.
Market Selloff + Company Specific Fears of Losing Distribution
Charlie Munger on Washington Post:
“And what happen was in the noise of short term trading, they happen to catch the worst stock panic since the collapse in stock prices in the Great Depression, and they also hit a collapse in the stock of the Washington Post because they got on the wrong side of the Nixon administration during Watergate and people were afraid that the Nixon administration was going to take away their licenses to television stations.”
More information on the WaPo situation:
Cardlytics:
Both have the similarities of a large market selloff, combined with the individual company fears of losing rights to a significant portions of their business.
With the Washington Post, it was the fear of losing the licenses / rights to the television stations, and with Cardlytics, it’s the fear of losing the rights to the bank channel of Chase.
Similar to the BofA fears, the odds of Chase leaving are already low. A few reasons for why Chase will most likely not drop CDLX were discussed in depth in my last post, and listed again here:
In-house / SMBs: There would be more room for concern if Chase didn’t already attempt an in-house solution and then after decided to switch to CDLX, or if Chase didn’t already acquire a card-linked offer player who was focused on SMBs that didn’t work out, or if Figg was able to successfully scale local through self-service instead of using aggregators (which leads to adding more offers quickly, but less attractive offers), or if there was a clear way for local offers to work within Chase at scale (if there are issues, will local branches be able to field questions?).
1st Party Data: Other suspected intentions have been related to Chase wanting to utilize first party data they don’t currently share with CDLX. If true, that would fit the fact that within the new self-service platform for banks on the new ad sever, CDLX built the ability for banks to share data but with a blind mechanism, to address issues and concerns originally mentioned by Chase.
The odds of Chase dropping CDLX will decrease further if Chase moves to the new ad server. Chase would not go through the time and work of moving to the new ad server only to immediately drop CDLX. This is why it has been a positive to see all the signs of Chase migrating to the new ad server (as discussed in my Research Notes).
Additionally, moving to the new ad server would increase Chase’s opportunity costs and switching costs, given CDLX would then be supplying Chase with product-level offers, local offers, a new UI (which would be very hard and confusing to roll back on users), self-service for banks, imagery within offers, and more.
These will not happen overnight. Luckily it seems Chase is hiring roles for Chase Offers that relate to rolling out features and capabilities with APIs, which seems to exactly match CDLX saying the banks will roll out new features and capabilities via API modules (also discussed in my Research Notes). This is also where execution from new CEO Karim Temsamani will be critical, to ensure Chase is able to roll out these features and experience the maximum benefit in the shortest time possible.
And as discussed next, CDLX’s market cap is currently below what is rational, even if Chase leaves.
Low Stock Price and Selling Significantly Below Intrinsic Value
Charlie Munger on Washington Post:
“So we used all that noise to find a place to look. Here was a time of low stock prices and panic. A place were one stock got clobbered for an unusual reason to suddenly that level. So we were using noise to get our hunting place. But once we got to the hunting place, we just figured out what the Post was worth if you just sold all the assets. And we decided that the stock was selling at about 1/6th of its intrinsic value.”
Cardlytics:
Both WaPo and CDLX experienced large stock price declines.
And although maybe more subjective, one could say Cardlytics’ intrinsic value based on future cash flow generation (not liquidation value) is also worth considerably more compared to the market cap today (compared to the WaPo back then), even under very conservative assumptions.
For example, my conservative calculations of intrinsic value in the last post that even account for losing Chase (and assumes a very conservative scenario of $0, where dilution is simply more likely), which all far exceed today’s low market cap:
Conservative Longer-Term Expected Value (Without Chase): $4.8B
Conservative Medium-Term Expected Value: $22B
Conservative Longer-Term Expected Value: $39B
Most investors stop too short in their determination of an impact of an event. More need to ask, “and then what”. If CDLX loses Chase, then what? Some haven’t given this enough thought, and they jump to the conclusion CDLX is a zero or “it’s a thesis breaker” or “too much dilution”, instead of actually revaluing the business or determining the next outcome. This is why my $0 scenario is too conservative above. In reality, a relatively small amount of dilution is the worst case-scenario related to Chase.
Note: Some have feared that between the recent RSU with the new CEO, Bridg earnout, stock-based compensation, and potential liquidity issues, that the dilution could increase significantly. This has even led others to not invest. However, if the future plays out even a fraction as I expect, then the increase in future prices will more than offset this dilution. Additionally, future cash flow (where CDLX remains on track to be FCF positive in 2023) can eventually be used to buy back stock (which was another reason the WaPo investment worked out so well).
For dilution calculations, see post my last post (related to CEO and Bridg earnout) or Quantitative Research Notes (related to liquidity from the worst case scenario with Chase).
Competitive Advantages
Charlie Munger on Washington Post:
“And it was of a type of enterprise that had what they called a durable competitive advantage, which is the ideal place to find a bargain.”
Cardlytics:
Cardlytics is a business with many competitive advantages, such as:
High Barriers to Entry from Trust / Social Proof / Ad Reach:
If a bank is deciding between CDLX and new competitor, it is hard to go with a new competitor where you have no idea if you can trust them with something as personal as purchase data (where CDLX has a long history of experience and no data leaks). This is why most banks have not shared this data with anyone else. They cannot take the risk of a data leak. This is also why I’m not sure even if I was able to raise significant capital if I could replicate CDLX. Trust cannot be gained quickly.
Additionally, when all the biggest banks are using and trusting CDLX, it is a signal / social proof that you (a likely smaller bank) can also trust CDLX.
Finally, given the point of this is to get the largest quantity, most relevant, and most attractive offers, you will want to go with the partner that can accomplish this, which leads to going to CDLX who already has the largest scale and ad reach.
Scale Advantages from Large Advertising Reach:
Given CDLX has large enough reach to attract advertisers directly, it makes it such that banks do not have to rely on affiliate advertising which has significantly less attractive offers and cash back for users. This is also why banks will have a difficult time holding off from using CDLX in the long term. While they can leverage light-integration substitutes like affiliate-content providers in the short term given the differences between that and CDLX are smaller currently, the difference will continue to widen as more advertisers use CDLX, making it much harder for banks to avoid using CDLX.
CDLX also provides revenue share to their bank partners. This is made possible by CDLX being able to still eventually create a profitable business from the scale, leading to earning enough gross profit (revenue - rev share) to overcome the high fixed costs (that remain fixed when adding more partners and ad spend). These high fixed costs make it difficult for competitors who cannot reach critical scale for advertisers to then overcome the costs, let alone at a reduce gross profit level if they attempt to match CDLX rev share. Additionally, if you as a competitor just starting out, it is not just a function of needing to sign up one or steal one bank from CDLX. You would need to convince multiple to get sufficient ad reach. In that period of time, you would also need to cover the financial burn from the high fixed costs. This is why there are so few (if any) competitors are left.
Better Underlying Data for Advertising:
Purchase data is one of the best underlying data for advertisers. This is a reason all the largest advertisers want it. Actual transactional data leads to better targeting. What better way to determine what a person will buy than what they have bought and are currently buying? This data also leads to much better measurement, given it is based on actual transactional data (both online and in stores). CDLX can provide the true incrementality of spending due to the ads from randomized control trials based on actual purchases, giving advertisers certainty in the results (The incrementality from RCT accounts for buyers who would have bought anyways, as they would be represented in both the control and test group in a sufficiently large and randomized sample, with the only difference being users shown an offer in the test group. Therefore if CDLX did not work, the buying levels from those who would have bought anyways would be equal between the two groups, with no incremental lift from CDLX).
High Switching Costs:
Takes times for advertisers to learn a new advertising platform, takes times to gain a banks trust, takes time to integrate the platform (and given banks move slowly, it will take time remove and switch), hard to switch and lose engagement and revenue share, etc.
Growing Customer Value Proposition (CVP):
CDLX is increasing their CVP by now offering product-level offers, local offers, a new UI, and more. These all benefit the users (more offers + more relevant offers + more cash back), the banks (higher engagement), and the advertisers (allows brands and CPGs to advertise, can add images to offers to increase understanding, smaller advertisers can now have offers within CDLX, etc.)
There is also self-reinforcing growth of the CVP from increases in partnerships with the banks and neobanks, leading to more scale and data for advertisers, attracting more advertisers and ad spend, leading to more attractive offers for users, leading to more engagement and redemption, attracting more banks and neobanks and so on. This growing competitive advantage leads to the business being harder for competition to replicate, leading to a longer business life and more cash flow generation.
I believe as these competitive advantages continue to grow, Cardlytics will earn a higher market share of US and Global ad spend (TAM).
100 Bagger
Charlie Munger on Washington Post:
“And so everything was favorable, and so we just charged in bought $10M worth of Washington Post, and in due course it became worth a billion dollars.”
Not seen here is that a portion of the growth in value for Berkshire was due to the Washington Post buying back their shares over time. This led to Berkshire’s stake increasing from around 10% to 18% without buying additional shares.
Cardlytics:
I believe Cardlytics will also eventually use a portion of cash flow to buy back shares.
Although CDLX is expected to be cash flow positive next year in 2023, I do not believe buy backs will occur as soon. New CEO Karim Temsamani has mentioned he will, “take calculated risks and invest in change. Stay ahead of the curve on the things that we know will change, not those that will stay the same” which could lead to investing in growth further before buying back shares.
This higher future cash flow over time that can be reinvested in the business or used for buybacks will come from:
Long Runway of Increasing Revenue: Cardlytics’ current operations as-is (tech, employees, etc.) have immense operating leverage and could handle significantly higher ad spend (and therefore revenue and cash flow). This could come from existing advertisers who have the ability to increase their ad spend over time (from CDLX increasing advertisers’ understanding of Cardlytics superior placement + targeting + measurement capabilities and why it should not be compared apples-to-apples to other platforms). Then you add in Bridg and product-level offers opening up more of the TAM (from CDLX continuing to cross sell to increase the number of Bridg clients), and then self-service to reach more small to medium businesses, and then top off with the opportunity of neobanks and international opportunity of Open Banking which both have little to no rev share, there is simply an incredibly long runway for CDLX.
Minimal Capital Requirements for Growth: There is very little capital requirements to facilitate this future revenue growth, leading to high levels of future cash flow.
Increasing Gross Profit: Additionally, gross profit could increase from the banks’ revenue share potentially decreasing over time from the use of Bridg data (FI share is based on the bank’s relative contribution of data, which has always been 100%, but could decrease from adding in Bridg’s SKU data which the banks do not have nor own).
High Sustainability: Advertising has been around forever, with no end in sight. Even better here is that the advertising is solicited by the users (they choose to look at these ads, rather than the advertiser having to place unwanted ads just where the eyeballs are and hope there is frequent and long usage to have a higher chance of ad effectiveness) and a portion of ad spend goes into the pockets of the users and the banks, benefiting everyone. If more users use mobile wallets like Apple Pay, CDLX offers still work. And even if Apple had their own cards linked offers solution, advertisers could still place offers at the bank level as a different location of advertising, that would then reach users regardless of the phone they had and would see all transactions. Cardlytics also thought ahead, where even if primary transactions shift from the traditional banks to the neobanks, Cardlytics purchased Dosh in 2021 to remove this risk (which is why they refer to it as an insurance policy), given Dosh powers the offers in the neobanks.
In terms of the similarity of returns, we will have to wait and see whether Cardlytics will increase 100x from these levels. I strongly believe ~$40B future market cap (and higher) is very possible, but anything could happen.
A large reason for the recent price decline was first the fear of BofA not renewing (which proved to be an incorrect fear, given BofA did in fact renew), and the next decline was due to the new fear of losing Chase. Therefore it is possible that the stock price could increase once that perceived risk decreases from:
Clear evidence of Chase on to the new ad server (currently there are clues of them being in progress, as discussed in my Research Notes)
Chase’s intention and use of Figg becoming known (rather than simply assumed)
Chase extending their current contract with CDLX
Further adjustments in price will come more from financials, such as:
Increases in monthly active users, or MAUs (such as signing USAA given Figg, or AmEx due to providing them local offers + product-level offers + new UI + ability to share data with the blind mechanism on the new self-service for banks on the new ad server)
Increase in average revenue per user, or ARPU (from the new ad server and related benefits like product-level offers + local offers + new UI, as discussed recently in my Quantitative Research Notes, as well as from increases in understanding of the superior nature of Cardlytics for placement + targeting + measurement of advertising).
Combine those two with operating leverage, and CDLX should see increasing levels of cash flow. It will be much harder to rationalize a stock price that is at a single digit multiple of cash flow (let alone CF > market cap) when there is still such a long runway for growth and high ROIC.
Short-Term Price vs Long-Term Value
Charlie Munger on Washington Post:
“We didn’t anticipate [losing money in the short term] but we knew it could happen and we cheerfully endured it. Why wouldn’t you ensure it when you are getting 6x as much value as you are paying for? And all of sudden its 8x as much value you are paying.”
Cardlytics:
Relevant to the Cardlytics situation, where I have always felt the price was cheap in relation to the long-term cash flow generation, let alone today at around $400M.
As long as there is no disconfirming evidence, there is less to worry about with the price declines (And while some feel Chase acquiring Figg is disconfirming to the thesis that banks cannot do this on their own [which assumes that is even Chase’s intentions, which doesn’t seem to be the case], that is the incorrect thesis. We know banks can currently do this on their own, such as AmEx or even others who just use third-party affiliate content. But the thesis is in the long term the banks will not use anyone else or an internal solution, due to a much higher value proposition with CDLX that is still growing).
And in actuality, as the price has continued to decline, the probability of success and therefore expected future value has also increased at the same time. This is one of the best situations in investing.
Mispriced Bet: The price has declined beyond a reasonable amount. Even if Cardlytics lost Chase, CDLX is worth considerably more (based on the possible future of cash flow). But the odds of Chase leaving are considerably less than most assume. I wouldn’t be surprised if most assume near 95% of Chase leaving, when in reality it is 95% Chase staying, leading to this mispriced bet.
Stronger Competitive Position: With Chase buying Figg, Chase removed CDLX’s only close competitor, leaving no real other option for other banks / neobanks. Upon this, if Chase improves targeting with 1st party data or adds SMB content, it will only enhance the Chase channel for CDLX, increasing overall engagement. CDLX can dedicate more time to other initiatives, rather than spreading themselves thinner across all possibilities, such that the focus by both parties on different offerings will lead to the best outcome.
CDLX Improving: New CEO with a tech background (Google and Stripe) to monetize the asset the founders built, new CTO and CPO, acquired Bridg for SKU-data for insights and targeting as well as product-level offers (doubling TAM), local offers from using third-party content providers and their recent acquisition of Entertainment, new user experience similar to that of Dosh (another relatively recent acquisition), and all major banks soon to be on the new ad server (unlocking all these offerings). The following line from the 1974 Annual Report of the Washington Post stood out to me, given it seems to match CDLX with all these recent improvements:
The Only Option
Charlie Munger on Washington Post:
“and we knew what the Washington Post was worth because it was the strongest newspaper in a big market and was soon obviously going to destroy its competitor and be the only newspaper in that market.”
Cardlytics:
Another interesting similarity is with Chase’s acquisition of Figg, Cardlytics has likely become the only option for banks to aggregate their reach and receive better access to advertisers and have a dedicated resource with much more advanced and established technology.
Enormous Value Selling at a Huge Discount from Intrinsic Value
Charlie Munger on Washington Post:
And so an idiot could figure out that it was an enormous value selling at a huge discount from intrinsic value. Opportunity like that doesn’t come along very often, but you don’t need an opportunity like that very often. Once in a lifetime is enough.”
Cardlytics:
This is one reason I have continued doing everything in my power to make the most of the CDLX situation.
If everyone agreed that Chase was staying, or more generally, if everyone else believed Cardlytics was a good business, then this investment opportunity would not exist.
It is always possible CDLX loses Chase or even another bank. It is possible something unexpected occurs. There are many possibilities and different scenarios that could occur, but the odds are overwhelming tilted in favor of a positive outcome. I recognize the negative outcomes could occur, but I’m willing to take that bet. Situations like this don’t come around often.
Closing
The Washington Post’s history may not exactly repeat here with Cardlytics, but it could rhyme.
For all my notes and thoughts on CDLX, which I continually update and is over 600 pages, check out my Qualitative and Quantitative “Research Notes”:
(Given the quantity of new notes, and hitting Substack limits, I had to split the notes once again)
Qualitative:
Cardlytics $CDLX: Qualitative Research Notes #1 (268 Pages, 94,958 words)
Cardlytics $CDLX: Qualitative Research Notes #2 (65 Pages, 20,037 words)
Quantitative:
Cardlytics $CDLX: Quantitative Research Notes #1 (209 Pages, 73,442 words)
Cardlytics $CDLX: Quantitative Research Notes #2 (139 Pages, 45,224 words)
These notes contain information I have not shared anywhere else. For more general information on Research Notes, see here.
I have been adding a significant quantity of new notes lately, given the many changes around the company. I expect this to continue. Once things settle down, I will shift my focus to releasing my Carvana notes, which for the large number of you who are already paid subscribers (and the substantial number of new paid subscribers this quarter), you will have access to all current and future notes. I have greatly appreciated your positive feedback lately, and I look forward to continuing adding to these notes, with intentions of expanding them to more companies over the years.
Follow-Up
If you have any questions or push back on any of the above, please contact me. I would enjoy discussing more.
-Austin Swanson (Swany407)
Twitter: @Swany407
Website: Swany407.com
More Information on Cardlytics
Research Notes
Free Posts
CDLX 2.0 (Chase Acquiring Figg, New CEO, New Banks, BofA Renewal, 22Q2 Earnings, and more): Write-up and video
Current Price Decline, Short Thesis, and Q1 2022 Earnings: Write-up and video
Open Banking (The Free Option on the Hidden Potential Cash Cow): Write-up and video
The Power of Bridg (and Why CDLX is Undervalued): Write-up and video
BofA Renewal & Testing Competitors (Update): Write-up and video
New Observations, Upcoming Earnings Calls, and Updated Allocations (10.21.2021): Write-Up and video
Thoughts Following Q2 2021 Earnings and Price Decline: Write-up and video
Thoughts After Price Decline (5.17.2021): Write-up and video
Disclaimer: This content is not investment advice, and is intended for educational and informational purposes only. Before making any investment, you should do your own analysis. Please see the Disclaimer page for more details.